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This paper analyzes the perspectives of the in many ways surprising development in 
Egypt since early 2011 for the strategic relations between Egypt and the EU. First of all 
existing bilateral agreements between the EU and Egypt will be discussed and to which 
degree changes are in the pipeline as a result of the political changes in Egypt and the 
Middle East following the Arab revolts. Furthermore significant strategic agreements 
which Egypt has entered with regional partners in the Middle East are discussed in the 
context of Egyptian-European relations. Finally it is the ambition to discuss to which 
degree we will see changes of foreign and security policy relations between Egypt and 
the EU after the fall of the Mubarak regime and the start of an unclear but significant 
transformation process.  
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Introduction  
The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) Progress Report, published 15 May 2012, 
describes how Egypt experienced profound change and daunting political and 
economic challenges during 2011.1 Following widespread demonstrations, which 
started in late January 2011, the authoritarian regime of President Hosni Mubarak was 
toppled and replaced by the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), which – 
having told Mubarak, that if he didn’t step down, a charge of high treason would be 
imposed on him – took over presidential, legislative and executive powers.2 
Later in 2011 and the beginning of 2012 elections were held, which resulted in the 
formation of a parliament, in which the Islamist parties play a dominant role. 
Mohammad Morsi, the leader of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) Freedom and Justice 
Party (FJP), one of the most important Islamist parties in the new Government, won the 
presidential elections and assumed office as President on the 30th of June 2012 – and 
immediately after that he resigned from the presidency of the FJP.  
A power  struggle between the military and civilian parts of the state were 
obvious (and widely discussed in the media) before presidential elections were held 
and since Morsi took office a conflict between him and the SCAF leaders has been a 
reality. On the 12th of August 2012, Morsi asked Mohamad Hussein Tantawi, head of 
the country's armed forces, and Sami Anan, the Army chief of staff, to resign – and 
what in the beginning looked like a planned deal with the army leaders, developed in a 
few days into dismissals of a larger group of former army leaders and people from the 
media. It seems to be in accordance with the demands of the Egyptian revolution to 
assert civilian control. And even though Tantawi and a few others are appointed 
advisory positions, there is no doubt that their power is reduced significantly. On the 
other hand the open question now seems to be to which degree the Muslim 
Brotherhood will dominate the new constitutional assembly. That will, as mentioned 
by Lynch, be the major issue of the coming period, and not the least whether this 
dominance translates into an Islamist bias of the new constitution.3 
This paper will analyze the perspectives of the in many ways surprising 
development in Egypt since early 2011 for the strategic relations between Egypt and 
the EU. First of all existing bilateral agreements between the EU and Egypt will be 
discussed and to which degree changes are in the pipeline as a result of the political 
                                                          
1 EU-COMMISSION 2012b. Implementation of the European Neighbourhood Policy in Egypt. 
Progress in 2011 and recommendations for action. Delivering on a new European 
Neighbourhood Policy. Brussels: EU-Commission. 
2 LESCH, A. M. 2011. Egypt's Spring: Causes of the Revolution. Middle East Policy, 18, 35-48., p. 
46. 
3 LYNCH, M. 2012. Lamborghini Morsi. In: LYNCH, M. (ed.) Abu Aardwark's Middle East Blog. 
Washington. 
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changes in Egypt and the Middle East following the Arab revolts. Furthermore 
significant strategic agreements which Egypt has entered with regional partners in the 
Middle East are discussed in the context of Egyptian-European relations. Finally it is 
the ambition to discuss to which degree we will see changes of foreign and security 
policy relations between Egypt and the EU after the fall of the Mubarak regime and the 
start of an unclear but significant transformation process. 
 
EU-Egyptian relations prior to the fall of Mubarak 
As described at the European External Action Service (EEAS) ENP homepage the EEC 
and Egypt began diplomatic relations back in 1966, when Gamal Abdel Nasser was 
President of Egypt. Ten years later, in 1976, a first Cooperation Agreement was signed, 
aiming at establishing a “wide-ranging cooperation between the parties involved (…) 
designed to contribute towards the economic and social development of the Mashreq 
countries.”4 The agreement contained a financial protocol, which defined the amount 
and details of the EEC contributions to Egypt given as loans and grants, with loans as 
the largest part. Compared to recent aid the amounts of the 1970s were rather modest. 
The different aid resources were to be considered direct contributions by the European 
Community to Egypt, but were (from the European side) thought of as “a stimulus for 
the mobilization of capital from other sources.”5 
As pointed out by Bicchi the EEC “invented” the Mediterranean in the first half 
of the 1970s, due to challenges emerging “on the European horizon. The first was 
terrorism, due to a shift of strategy by Arab-Palestinians determined to bring their fight 
closer to the Europeans. The second issue (…) culminated with the oil shock in 1973.”6 
Both issues indirectly touched upon EU-Egyptian relations, not the least because Egypt 
was (and is) a very important Arab state, with its Nasserist legacy, its huge population, 
the Arab League office in Cairo etc. The EEC launched in 1972 the Global 
Mediterranean Policy (GMP) aiming at regulating relations between the EEC and the 
non-European states around the Mediterranean, mainly with a focus on trade and aid. 
Later the GMP was followed by the Euro-Arab Dialogue (EAD), with ambitions of 
establishing a dialogue with a broader focus: discussing political, social, economic and 
cultural issues. The GMP and the EAD never developed into significant agreements – 
“it was only in 1980, with the Venice Declaration, that member states achieved and 
publicly supported a common position on the Middle East.”7  
                                                          
4 Commission of the European Communities: Cooperation agreements between the European 
Community and Egypt, Jordan and Syria, December 1976. 
5 Ibid. 
6 BICCHI, F. 2007. European Foreign Policy Making Toward the Mediterranean, New York; 
Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan., p. 64. 
7 Ibid., p. 93. 
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With the Venice Declaration the EEC might have entered the global political 
scene, but still for many years ahead without any significant foreign policy impact. As 
described by Bicchi: “if the Venice Declaration was a landmark in the development of 
European cooperation in foreign policy, it soon fell short of expectations as follow-on 
documents and missions sent to the area failed to accomplish any of their substantial 
aims.”8 This reality did not change in the coming decades, where the EU continued to 
represent an approach based on soft-power elements, among which democracy 
promotion played an important role. Also later on, following 9.11, when the US 
launched its war on terror, the EU reiterated this view, not the least, as mentioned by 
Rutherford, in its new common security strategy of December 2003, “A Secure Europe 
in a Better World”.9 This view, building on the belief that democratic states would be 
the most effective in dealing with international security, was frequently put forward by 
leading EU spokesmen and emphasized in official documents, where terrorism was 
emphasized. A characteristic statement can be found in “A Secure Europe…”, stating 
that terrorism “puts lives at risk; it imposes large costs; it seeks to undermine the 
openness and tolerance of our societies, and it poses a growing strategic threat to the 
whole of Europe.”10  
In pursuing this interest of dealing with the terror phenomenon the EU to some 
degree has shared a commonality of interests with the authoritarian regimes in the 
Middle East. Both the European and the Middle Eastern states have an interest in 
developing a security environment across the Mediterranean, as described by Aliboni 
and Ammor: “in the past few years, cooperation between governments across the two 
coasts of the Mediterranean Sea in suppressing Islamist terrorism and regulating 
immigration has increased markedly, in both the bilateral and the EU/EMP 
framework.”11 An aspect of this is that security cooperation at the operational level 
between the secret services of Europe and the states in the Middle East probably 
increased after 9.11. This might have had consequences for the regime resilience of 
Middle Eastern states, and added to that it underlines pragmatic tendencies in EU 
foreign policy, as demonstrated by for instance Seeberg.12 
                                                          
8 Ibid., p. 116. 
9 RUTHERFORD, B. K. 2008. Egypt after Mubarak. Liberalism, Islam and Democracy in the Arab 
World, Princeton University Press, Princeton and Oxford. 
10 EU-COMMISSION. 2003. A secure Europe in a better world. European Security Strategy. 
Brussels, 12 December 2003. Available from: 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf [Accessed 1 October 2012]. 
11 ALIBONI, R. & AMMOR, F. M. 2009. Under the Shadow of 'Barcelona': From the EMP to the 
Union for the Mediterranean. EuroMesco Paper, January 2009, 1-34., p. 14. 
12 SEEBERG, P. 2010b. Union for the Mediterranean – pragmatic multilateralism and the de-
politicization of European-Middle Eastern relations. Middle East Critique, 19, 287-302, SEEBERG, 
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The Arab revolts, Egypt and the EU 
The official EU approach to the new developments in the Middle East has been one of 
support for the new, democratic tendencies, as it could be seen with the launching of 
“A New Response to a Changing Neighbourhood”13 of 25 May 2011. Taking its point of 
departure in the “overthrow of long-standing repressive regimes in Egypt and Tunisia; 
the ongoing military conflict in Libya, the recent violent crackdown in Syria, continued 
repression in Belarus and the lingering protracted conflicts in the region, including in 
the Middle East”, the EU-Commission modestly stated that “The EU needs to rise to 
the historical challenges in our neighbourhood”. Furthermore it was claimed that “EU 
assistance has increased and is better targeted. But there is room for improvement on 
all sides of the relationship. Recent events and the results of the review have shown 
that EU support to political reforms in neighbouring countries has met with limited 
results.”14 As one of the most important Arab countries Egypt was mentioned several 
times in the EU document and the policy ambitions on behalf of the EU obviously saw 
Egypt as one of the main players in connection with the new developments in the 
Middle East – not the least because of the fall of Hosni Mubarak.  
The new strategy expressed support for “deep democracy”, defined as “free and 
fair elections; freedom of association, expression and assembly and a free press and 
media; the rule of law administered by an independent judiciary and right to a fair 
trial; fighting against corruption; security and law enforcement sector reform 
(including the police) and the establishment of democratic control over armed and 
security forces.”15 Furthermore the EU wanted to promote a thriving civil society by 
supporting organizations and NGO’s. And finally the EU wanted to encourage 
political and security co-operation, taking a point of departure in how the Lisbon 
Treaty should provide the EU with an opportunity of becoming a more effective 
foreign policy actor in maintaining its geopolitical, economic and security interests. 
Added to these mainly political ambitions the “New Strategy” contained relatively 
non-committing and general references to promoting sustainable economic growth, 
strengthening trade ties and enhancing sector cooperation (energy, environment etc.).  
Also of significance – and of relevance for Egypt – was the ambition of 
establishing so-called Mobility Partnerships, an idea which still is not implemented in 
any MENA-state. So far Mobility Partnership agreements have only been signed with 
                                                                                                                                                                          
P. 2010a. European Neighbourhood Policy, post-normativity and pragmatism. European Foreign 
Affairs Review, 15, 663-679. 
13 EU-COMMISSION 2011. A new response to a changing Neighbourhood. Brussels: High 
Representative of The Union For Foreign Affairs And Security Policy and the European 
Commission. 
14 Ibid., p. 1. 
15 Ibid., p. 3. 
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the Republic of Moldova and Georgia. Obviously migration is an extremely important 
and also sensitive field, not the least in a security perspective. However, long-term 
interests are at stake for the EU: “Labour mobility is an area where the EU and its 
neighbours can complement each other. The EU’s workforce is ageing and labour 
shortages will develop in specific areas. Our neighbourhood has well educated, young 
and talented workers who can fill these gaps.”16 As mentioned the Mobility 
Partnership ambition is not carried out in a MENA context yet, but the “New Strategy” 
mentions that the Commission, beyond the covenants with Moldovia and Georgia, will 
seek to conclude negotiations with Armenia and prepare for the launch of negotiations 
with e.g. Morocco, Tunisia and Egypt. The Egyptian migration is significant and even 
though it, compared to for instance Morocco or Turkey, is less oriented towards 
Europe, it represents an important aspect of Middle Eastern migratory processes.17 
The New Strategy finally expressed ambitions in establishing a so-called 
“Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity in the Southern Mediterranean”. 
Also this was rather imprecise in its wording, but it should be mentioned that the 
fundamental elements from the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) were obvious, 
emphasizing the positive conditionality built into the ENP right from its start in 2004. 
As stated somewhat paradoxically in the document, the EU “does not seek to impose a 
model or a ready-made recipe for political reform, but it will insist that each partner 
country’s reform process reflect a clear commitment to universal values that form the 
basis of our renewed approach. The initiative lies with the partner and EU support will 
be tailored accordingly.” In short: “The more and the faster a country progresses in its 
internal reforms, the more support it will get from the EU.”18 
From an overall perspective it seems that the Arab revolts only to a minor degree 
have had consequences for the narrative of the “New Strategy”. A year later, however, 
with the changes in the MENA region, first and foremost in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya, 
the official EU documents appear somewhat different in their rhetoric. An example of 
this can be seen in a “Joint Communication to the European Parliament, the Council, 
The European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions” 
called “Delivering on a new European Neighbourhood Policy”. In the Introduction of 
the document it is stated that: “Last year's changes in the Neighbourhood, in particular 
in the Southern Mediterranean but also in Eastern Europe, led to a rapid EU response.” 
                                                          
16 Ibid., p. 11. 
17 GHONEIM, A. F. 2010. Labour migration for decent work, economic growth and 
development in Egypt. International Migration Papers. Geneva: International Labour Office. 
BARTOLOMEO, A. D., FAKHOURY, T. & PERRIN, D. 2010. Egypt. In: CARIM (ed.) CARIM - 
Migration Profile. Florence. 
18 EU-COMMISSION 2011. A new response to a changing Neighbourhood. Brussels: High 
Representative of The Union For Foreign Affairs And Security Policy and the European 
Commission., p. 17. 
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Somewhat surprisingly it is claimed, that with the “The New Strategy for a Changing 
Neighbourhood” of May 2011, the EU “sent a clear message of solidarity and support 
to the peoples of the Southern Mediterranean. Their struggle for democracy, dignity, 
prosperity and safety from persecution would be supported by Europe.”19 
On the 13th of September 2012 the EU High Representative Catherine Ashton 
received the new Egyptian President Mohammad Morsi in Brussels. The meeting 
emphasized the European commitment to support Egypt and launched a so-called 
Task Force, which later in 2012 should result in action on a number of different issues. 
The Task Force is “meant to act as a catalyst for collective EU support, to encourage the 
democratic transition and to help restore economic and investor confidence.”20 
Furthermore the Task Force should initiate cooperation within tourism, job creation, 
transfer of technology and by solving a number challenges within these fields aim at 
promoting political and economic stability. Ashton met both the newly appointed 
Prime Minister Hesham Qandil and President Morsi in Cairo in July 2012 and it seem 
obvious that it is essential for the EU representatives to maintain regular contact with 
the new Egyptian political leaders. 
 
Egyptian-European relations: recent developments 
In the following an analysis will be carried out dealing with some of the most 
significant recent developments regarding Egyptian-European strategic relations. The 
analyses has its focus on the Egyptian side and concentrates on the political 
dimensions. The strategic challenges related to the relation between Egypt and Israel in 
the light of the ENP-Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) complex are briefly discussed. 
Furthermore light is shed on the MB and the Egyptian political transformation processs 
in a strategic perspective. Finally a more specific, but strategically important aspect of 
the new development is taken into consideration, namely the migration issue. As 
mentioned above this issue is emphasized in the revised ENP approach towards Egypt, 
not the least in connection the “Dialogue on Mobility, Migration and Security”.21 
Migration and security are continuously significant interrelated concepts within the 
framework of the EU’s strategic considerations towards its Mediterranean partners. 
 
                                                          
 
19 EU-COMMISSION 2012b. Implementation of the European Neighbourhood Policy in Egypt. 
Progress in 2011 and recommendations for action. Delivering on a new European 
Neighbourhood Policy. Brussels: EU-Commission. 
20 Statement by EU High Representative Catherine Ashton following her meeting with Egyptian 
President Morsi: EU and Egypt launch Task Force, Brussels, 13 September 2012. 
21 EU-COMMISSION 2012b. Implementation of the European Neighbourhood Policy in Egypt. 
Progress in 2011 and recommendations for action. Delivering on a new European 
Neighbourhood Policy. Brussels: EU-Commission., p. 12. 
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Egypt, Israel and the ENP-UfM complex 
Strategically the Israel-Palestine conflict is very important for the EU. This has been the 
case (at least) since the EU presented the Venice-declaration in 1980, as the first attempt 
at launching a “European” foreign policy towards the Middle East. The EU had as 
mentioned “invented” the Mediterranean in the early 1970s due to strategic challenges 
there, first of all the oil issue, secondly a new Palestinian strategy, which pulled Europe 
into Middle East politics.22 Despite the fact that the EU often by Israel is considered 
pro-Arab and that Israel might have a different strategic status for the EU as for the US, 
the security of Israel is also for the EU a significant issue. As shown by Dannreuther23 
the two-state solution constitutes a part of an EU foreign policy regime and as such a 
significant building stone in EU foreign and security policy. Therefore it is important 
for the EU that Egypt is in accordance with the EU in this crucial issue.  
Furthermore the narrative of the ENP takes its point of departure in the notion of 
a ring of peaceful neighbouring states as the best guarantee for Europe’s own security. 
The strategic ambition on behalf of the EU seems to be to adapt to the development of 
the given conditions as they unfold rather than to seek influence. The Egyptian-Israeli 
conflict, at the overall strategic level settled via the Camp David Accords of 1978-79, 
has had a renewed outbreak over the Gaza crisis in the beginning of 2009 and the 
appointment of Avigdor Lieberman as Minister of Foreign Affairs, which led to 
problems for the European-Egyptian cooperation and in November 2009 to 
postponement of a planned UfM meeting at Foreign Minister level in Istanbul. It was 
explained in a document from the European Parliament, that the meeting of Foreign 
Affairs Ministers which was to have been held in Istanbul on November 24–25, 2009, 
was postponed owing to a boycott by the Arab States, protesting against the Israeli 
position on the Middle East peace process.  
Unofficially an Egyptian official failed to invite the Israeli minister because of 
Lieberman’s insulting earlier remarks made against the Egyptian President (who at 
that time was co-president of the UfM). “Lieberman told Mubarak to ‘go to hell,’ 
because Mubarak continued to refuse to visit Israel—the incident led to that President 
Shimon Peres and former Foreign Minister Ehud Olmert issued an official apology.”24 
The contrast to the situation in 1977, where Sadat visited Israel and held a speech 
in the Knesset, is obvious. The historical breakthrough led to the Camp David Accord, 
which still constitutes an important part of the strategic set up behind the security of 
Israel, but not necessarily, as mentioned by Hashim, is guaranteed with a changing 
                                                          
22 See footnote 6. 
23 DANNREUTHER, R. 2007. Recasting the Barcelona Process: Europe and the Middle East. In: 
SEEBERG, P. (ed.) EU and the Mediterranean. Foreign Policy and Security. Odense: University 
Press of Southern Denmark. 
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leadership in Cairo.25 However, in the course of the electoral campaigns in 2011, the 
Muslim Brotherhood stated that they support the Camp David agreement, and this has 
later been reaffirmed by the FJP.26  Thus, at the strategic level there seems to be 
accordance between the new Egyptian leadership and the overall EU policies and 
tendencies to support a less pragmatic policy vis-à-vis Egypt seem to gain ground in 
Brussels, as demonstrated in a “Quick Policy Insight” from the Directorate-General for 
Political Policies in Brussels: “To uphold EU’s interests and values in Egypt and in the 
region, it would be highly advisable to give up the prudent approach that has so far 
determined EU policy”.27 
 
The Muslim Brotherhood and the Egyptian political transformation process 
The Egyptian elections took place under circumstances, which were completely 
different from what – democratically speaking – had been the highly problematic 
conditions under Mubarak (and also under Sadat and Nasser). The new political reality 
is therefore important and interesting to analyze, both regarding sociological and 
religious aspects. As mentioned in the EU document on the implementation of the ENP 
in Egypt the Egyptian electoral system was reformed in 2011: “Parliamentary elections 
were organized between November 2011 and February 2011 in a generally free and 
transparent manner and resulted in Islamic parties taking a strong lead in 
parliament.”28  
The MB FJP won 47% of the seats, the Salafist El Nour 24% and the New Wafd 
8%. Egypt declined an EU offer of fielding a fully-fledged observation mission for the 
elections, but accepted seven international NGOs observing the election process. 
Furthermore the EU funded civil society organizations supporting the electoral process 
through training of Egyptian election observers, raising awareness and capacity 
building. The results of the elections were not surprising. The MB relied on its efficient 
                                                                                                                                                                          
24 SEEBERG, P. 2010b. Union for the Mediterranean – pragmatic multilateralism and the de-
politicization of European-Middle Eastern relations. Middle East Critique, 19, 287-302. 
25 HASHIM, A. 2011. The Egyptian Military, Part Two: From Mubarak Onward. Middle East 
Policy, 18, 106-128. 
26 HAKALA, P. & NAPOLITANO, P. 2012. The Dawn of Parliamentary Democracy in Egypt. 
Available from: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/committees/fr/studiesdownload.html?languageDocument=EN
&file=73911 [Accessed 1 October 2012]. 
27 HAKALA, P. 2012. Egypt's transition back on track after Mohamed Mursi's victory. Available 
from: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/dmas/dv/qpi_240_/qpi_240_en
.pdf [Accessed 1 October 2012]. 
28 EU-COMMISSION 2012b. Implementation of the European Neighbourhood Policy in Egypt. 
Progress in 2011 and recommendations for action. Delivering on a new European 
Neighbourhood Policy. Brussels: EU-Commission., p. 1. 
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organization and won a landslide victory, not the least as a result of what Allam names 
the power vacuum in Egypt after the fall of Mubarak.29 
The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt has in 2011 and 2012 had severe internal strife 
which is partly a result of different perceptions of the relation between religion and 
politics between factions of the party. The fact that segments of the party want a clear-
cut Islamist platform can easily lead to confrontations with the representatives of the 
old regime, as it could be seen in connection with the presidential elections. But, on the 
other hand, a “modernization” of the party in the form of tendencies to secularism 
might drive parts of the Egyptian electorate back into the arms of the old establishment 
or of the Salafists.30 
El Sherif has pointed to this internal conflict in the Muslim Brotherhood, where 
we see “an emboldened group of MB insiders who strongly oppose what they have 
characterized as the party’s extremely timid agenda of reform.” El Sherif makes the 
point that the new tendencies within the Brotherhood, by working on reshaping 
Islamist discourses on governance and democracy, are “undermining the polarization 
between Islamists and secularists that long inhibited the development of policy-
oriented (rather than identity-based) party politics.”31 If this actually is the case, maybe 
– as discussed by Bayat and Adib-Moghaddam – we might be witnessing important 
contours of a changing political Islam, on one side representing new and interesting 
political developments, on the other side possibilities of paralyzing faction strife.32 
The EU does not have a tradition for close cooperation with Islamist parties in the 
Middle East. Rather they have been met with an arms-length policy, and from time to 
time a refusal of cooperation as after the elections in the occupied Palestinian territories 
in January 2006, when “the EU harshly turned against the achievements of the 
                                                          
29 ALLAM, R. S. 2012. The Islamists in the Realm of the Egyptian Revolution. In: IEMED. (ed.) 
Euro-Mediterranean Policies in the Light of the Arab Spring. Barcelona: IEMed., p. 122. 
30 According to Rutherford this tendency is no novelty. Already in the 1990s a group of younger 
members of the MB “wanted to clarify the organization’s political objectives in a manner that 
showed a willingness to work within existing political institutions to achieve change that was 
peaceful and incremental.” See RUTHERFORD, B. K. 2008. Egypt after Mubarak. Liberalism, Islam 
and Democracy in the Arab World, Princeton University Press, Princeton and Oxford., p. 96. As for 
the preconditions for a moderation-trend of the Egyptian Islamists, see UTVIK, B. O. 2005. Hizb 
al-Wasat and the Potential for Change in Egyptian Islamism. Critique: Critical Middle Eastern 
Studies, 14, 293-306. 
31EL SHERIF, A. 2012. Egypt’s New Islamists: Emboldening Reform from Within. Sada [Online]. 
Available from: http://carnegieendowment.org/sada/2012/01/12/egypt-s-new-islamists-
emboldening-reform-from-within/8z6r [Accessed 1 October 2012]. 
32 BAYAT, A. 2011. The Post-Islamist Revolutions. Foreign Affairs, Snapshot. See also ADIB-
MOGHADDAM, A. 2012. The Arab Revolts, Islam and Postmodernity. Middle East Journal of 
Culture and Communication, 5, 15-25. 
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Palestinian reform movement when it brought unexpected results.”33 The situation 
after the Egyptian elections in 2011 and 2012 does contain some similarities with what 
took place in Palestine in 2006, but also differences. First of all the context is different. 
The maybe most important official reason for the EU’s decision to freeze funds to the 
Hamas led administration was Hamas’ denial of recognizing Israel.  
According to the EU Egypt has under MB leadership remained an active partner 
in the Middle East Peace Process. Egypt has even played a role in moving Palestinian 
factions closer to reconciliation and motivating the Palestinians to take part in a 
prisoner swap including the release of Gilat Shalit. The progress is reflected in the 
positive wording of the official ENP document: “The EU will continue to do all it can to 
support the peaceful and orderly transition to a civilian and democratic government in 
Egypt. Egypt is a key player in the Arab world, and a full and reliable partner in 
international affairs, so steps forward in Egypt are crucial for democracy-building in 
the Middle East and North Africa. The EU is aware there are many challenges ahead. 
But will continue to stand by Egypt and its people in their quest for both deep 
democracy and economic opportunity.”34 
The EU has of course realized that the former strategic alliance with the Mubarak 
regime is history. A new complex reality in which different types of policy actors have 
entered the political scene needs to be dealt with. The SCAF and the MB are of course 
some of the most important institutional expressions of the new situation. But added to 
that a participating population has become a key factor. The Egyptian revolt against 
Mubarak was dominated by the middle class in the big cities and especially Cairo. 
Kandil poses the question “Why was the middle class at the forefront of the 
demonstrations while the peasants remained conspicuously absent, while the workers 
hesitated, while the slum dwellers watched from the sidelines, and while one half of 
the upper class defended the regime fiercely and the other half had their jet engines 
running?”35 The answer is not to be provided here, but the point that the growing new 
Egyptian middle class might be an actor, with which the EU could set up an interesting 
political alliance. 
 
The EU, Egypt and the migration issue 
                                                          
33 PACE, M. 2010. Paradoxes and contradictions in EU democracy promotion in the 
Mediterranean: the limits of EU normative power. In: PACE, M. & SEEBERG, P. (eds.) The 
European Union's Democratization Agenda in the Mediterranean. London and New York: 
Routledge. 
34 EU-COMMISSION 2012b. Implementation of the European Neighbourhood Policy in Egypt. 
Progress in 2011 and recommendations for action. Delivering on a new European 
Neighbourhood Policy. Brussels: EU-Commission., p. 6. 
35 KANDIL, H. 2012. Why did the Egyptian Middle Class March to Tahrir Square? Mediterranean 
Politics, 17, 197-215., p. 197 
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Egypt is one of the largest emigration countries in the Middle East and in this respect it 
is very important for the EU to keep an eye on the migratory movements in and out of 
the country.36 According to the Migration and Remittances Factbook by the World 
Bank Egypt is with 3,7 mio. emigrants number one among the top ten emigration 
countries in the Middle East.37 They are, however, also the recipient of a large number 
of transit migrants, a large part of which are coming from Sudan, Somalia, Ethiopia 
and Eritrea. One of the reasons for this is that Egypt is hosting large resettlement 
programmes – run partly by the UNHCR and partly by national programmes financed 
by Canada, Australia and others. 
It can be difficult 100% precisely to distinguish between economic and political 
causes for migration towards Egypt and often there will probably be some overlap.38 
During 2011 a large number of Egyptian migrant workers left Libya and probably it 
will take some time before they are back again. This has of course affected the amount 
of remittances received and added to that the unstable situation in the region has 
reduced the migration-induced income significantly. Historically, as shown by Dina 
Abdelfattah, the Egyptian regime has considered migration as an important pillar in its 
economic strategy and “a way of letting pressure out of the labour market, and 
providing financial gains that outweighed the cost of brain drain.”39 The for the regime 
important remittances have been affected by the return of many Egyptians, especially 
migrant workers who left Libya during 2011, but it is still impossible to say anything 
about the actual amounts of “lost means”.40  
Abdelfattah mentions that in the fall of 2011, against expectations, the Central 
Bank of Egypt issued a report covering 2010-2011 showing the highest amount of 
remittances in the history of Egypt. Obviously this can be a result of the return of 
Egyptian migrants, who in connection with their return transferred their deposits to 
the home country. The political dispute related to the decision by UAE to close the 
doors on Egyptian migrants following the announcement by Egypt that it would put 
Hosni Mubarak on a trial probably also has had some significance. The conflict was 
apparently solved after a visit by the Egyptian Prime Minister Essam Sharaf to UAE, 
which took place in July 2011. 
The political unrest in 2011 has led to increasing instability in Egypt, higher 
unemployment and economic problems for the ordinary Egyptians. Not surprisingly 
                                                          
36 BARTOLOMEO, A. D., FAKHOURY, T. & PERRIN, D. 2010. Egypt. In: CARIM (ed.) CARIM - 
Migration Profile. Florence. 
37 WORLD-BANK 2011. Migration and Remittances Factbook, Washington DC, World Bank. 
38 ROMAN, H. 2006. Transit Migration in Egypt. Research Reports Florence: European University 
Institute., p. 31. 
39 ABDELFATTAH, D. 2011. Impact of Arab Revolts on Migration. CARIM Analytic and Synthetic 
Notes Florence: Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies. 
40 Ibid., p. 1 and 8. 
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this contributes to creating a migration push-factor, as it has been demonstrated in a 
survey by the IOM. Based on 750 interviews in 17 different governorates in March and 
April 2011 the survey showed that despite people being rather optimistic about their 
long-term future, they were worried about the current security situation and the lack of 
job opportunities.41  
The motivation among the youngsters for migration seems first and foremost to 
be economic:  
 
“The most important push factors for the young Egyptians who wish to migrate 
remain lack of employment opportunities and unsatisfactory living conditions. 
The most important pull factor is the possibility of gaining higher wages abroad 
then in Egypt (...) Young Egyptians identified, Arab countries, especially Saudi 
Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, as their favorite countries of destination.”42  
 
To fulfill those ambitions might, as mentioned above, be a problem, because of the 
gradual replacement of Arabs by migrants from different Asian countries. The 
European relations with Egypt regarding migration are described in the ENP Action 
Plan and focuses on legal aspects and practical issues related to control of migration 
flows in cooperation between the EU and Egypt. The Egyptian migration towards the 
EU is for historical reasons rather limited – in spite of the fact that Egypt has enormous 
potential, the main migration to Europe from the Middle East comes from the Maghreb 
states and Turkey. This is reflected in the Action Plan, which regarding migration is 
vague and unspecific. The uprisings in Egypt throughout 2011 are as mentioned hardly 
likely to change the preferred destinations for the Egyptian migrants, so that the EU 
becomes one of them. 
As part of what is termed the EU “renewed migration strategy” it is mentioned 
that Egypt will be included in the launching of Mobility Partnerships, which will be 
offered to Tunisia, Morocco and Egypt in the first instance: “Mobility Partnerships 
offer a concrete framework for dialogue and cooperation between the EU and non-EU 
countries. These partnerships are focused on facilitating and organizing legal 
migration, effective and humane measures to address irregular migration, and concrete 
steps towards reinforcing the development outcomes of migration.”43 So far, however, 
these initiatives are planned and it is not yet known when the actual implementation 
will take place. 
                                                          
41 PITEA, R. & HUSSAIN, R. 2011. Egypt after January 25. Survey of Youth Migration 
Intentions. Cairo: IOM. 
42 Ibid., p. 21. 
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The Mobility Partnerships have been offered Egypt in the summer of 2011: 
“Following exploratory talks in June 2011, the EU offered Egypt the prospect of 
opening of a comprehensive Dialogue on Mobility, Migration and Security, leading 
towards the conclusion of a Mobility Partnership. In September 2011 the Egyptian 
authorities declined the offer.”44 The reason for the Egyptian decline has to do with the 
fact that the Egyptian authorities have stated that they cannot commit to any 
agreement as long as the new political leaders have been unable to take responsibility 
for the question. The progress in the development of the Mobility Partnerships will in 
other words have to await a process of “normalization” of Egyptian politics. At the 
same time the European side will have to decide on how to develop this new foreign 
(and security) policy instrument. 
 
Conclusions 
As shown the Egyptian agreements with Israel of 1978-79 plays an important strategic 
role for the EU. This is also the case with the Peace Process, which according to official 
EU policies is still a relevant perspective and together with the idea of a two-state 
solution is a part of the EU foreign policy regime vis-à-vis the Middle East. The EU in 
its approach towards the regime of Mubarak has for many years avoided touching on 
politically sensitive issues and for pragmatic reasons supported the incumbent leader. 
Behind this lie interpretations of the security environment in the Mediterranean, where 
common security interests between Egypt and the EU have constituted an important 
part of the background for the pragmatism in European foreign and security policy. 
With the new political realities in Egypt this policy is no longer feasible. The EU 
will have to get accustomed to more binding forms of political cooperation with the 
Islamist parties and movements which now dominate the political scene in some of the 
Middle Eastern countries and Egypt in particular. This pragmatic realism is reflected in 
the official EU documents and the reciprocal visits of Morsi and Ashton in Egypt and 
Brussels seem to underline a new reality – at least at the rhetorical level. However, 
since the Egyptian uprisings, the EU’s approach has not changed significantly and the 
financial support has increased, but not to a degree where it really makes a difference. 
New policy instruments have been presented with the aim of dealing with the 
new developments in Egypt and some of the other Middle Eastern states. The so-called 
Mobility Partnerships are among the new tools launched in order to deal with a new 
reality. It seems that some of the “new tools” are old wine in new bottles and the major 
part is still work in progress. As demonstrated the Mobility Partnerships are not yet 
                                                                                                                                                                          
43 See the EEAS homepage: 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/11/1369&format=HTML&aged=0&l
anguage=EN&guiLanguage=en (accessed 1 November 2012). 
44 EU-COMMISSION 2012a. In: EU-COMMISSION (ed.). Brussels: EU-Commission., p. 12. 
Peter Seeberg: The Arab Revolts and the strategic relations between the EU and Egypt 
 
15 
implemented – on both sides there still remains work to be done. Migration and 
security are interrelated phenomena and this understanding is mutual on both sides of 
the Mediterranean, regardless of whether we are speaking of an authoritarian Mubarak 
regime or an Islamist government in (reversible?) democratic transition. 
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